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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
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This case arises from a bitter bidding dispute for a 
contract to strip and repaint the Commodore Barry Bridge. 
The Delaware River Port Authority (“DRPA”) rejected the 
lowest bidder, Alpha Painting & Construction Company, Inc. 
(“Alpha”), because it determined that Alpha was not a 
“responsible” contractor. Instead, DRPA awarded the contract 
to Corcon, Inc. (“Corcon”). After its bid protest was denied, 
Alpha filed this lawsuit in District Court on an expedited 
basis seeking an injunction against DRPA. The District Court 
promptly held a four-day trial and concluded that DRPA 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. It then entered an order 
directing DRPA to award the contract to Alpha. DRPA 
appeals. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District 
Court’s ruling that DRPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
However, because we conclude that the District Court abused 
its discretion by directing that the contract be awarded to 
Alpha, we will vacate that portion of the order and remand to 
the District Court for the entry of a more limited injunction. 
 
I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
DRPA is a bi-state corporate instrumentality that 
owns, operates, and maintains four bridges that span the 
Delaware River between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 
including the Commodore Barry Bridge, a mile-long structure 
that supports five lanes of traffic. DRPA is governed by a 
Board of Commissioners and operated on a day-to-day basis 
by its staff of engineers, contracting administrators, legal 
counsel, and administrative support professionals. Recently, 
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DRPA’s staff determined that the Commodore Barry Bridge’s 
lead-based paint coating is deteriorating. DRPA decided to 
repaint the entire bridge, a substantial capital construction 
project that requires hiring a contractor capable of using 
highly specialized abrasive blast cleaning equipment to strip 
and contain the lead paint (hereinafter the “Bridge Project”). 
This equipment is necessary to protect workers, the public, 
and the environment from hazardous lead contaminants.  
 
DRPA divided the Bridge Project into three phases. 
Phase 1, now near completion, involved stripping and 
repainting the New Jersey approach spans. Corcon is 
performing that work. Phase 2, which DRPA is now 
soliciting, will involve repainting the Pennsylvania approach 
spans. Phase 3, which has not yet begun, will involve 
repainting the center span portion. The Phase 2 contract is the 
subject of the instant dispute (identified herein as “Contract 
No. CB-31-2016” or the Phase 2 contract). 
 
In early May, 2016, DRPA began soliciting bids for 
the Phase 2 contract. On June 16, 2016, the due date for 
submissions, DRPA received seven bids, including Alpha’s 
and Corcon’s. That same afternoon, DRPA assembled the 
bidders for Phase 2 in its conference room to open the bids 
publicly. Among those present were Adam Jacurak, DRPA’s 
senior engineer in charge of the Phase 2 project, Amy Ash, 
DRPA’s Director of Contract Administration, as well as the 
bidders. Ash opened the bid packages and declared Alpha the 
“apparent low bidder” because it bid the lowest price, 
$17,886,000. Corcon bid $17,896,200 (the second lowest 
price, $10,200 more than Alpha). 
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Both Alpha and Corcon have significant experience 
painting bridges. Alpha, a Maryland-based industrial painting 
contractor, has painted numerous bridges across the country 
and is prequalified to bid for such work in 40 states. Alpha 
has previously worked for DRPA, painting the Pennsylvania 
approach span of another one of its bridges between 2007 and 
2009. Alpha also worked on a non-DRPA project at 
Philadelphia’s 30th Street Station in 2014 as part of a joint 
venture with another contractor. Alpha has not performed any 
other work in Pennslyvania or New Jersey over the last five 
years. 
 
Corcon, a national bridge painting contractor, has also 
worked for DRPA. Currently, it is painting Phase 1 of the 
Bridge Project and there is evidence that it has recently 
painted other DRPA bridges as well. Moreover, DRPA is 
collaborating with Corcon on an extracurricular film project 
concerning Corcon’s work on the Commodore Barry and 
other DRPA bridges.1 
 
After DRPA determined that Alpha and Corcon were 
the lowest and second lowest bidders, respectively, it 
undertook a review of the bids. Over the next two months, 
after a process largely characterized by inaction and delay, 
DRPA ultimately rejected Alpha’s bid and selected Corcon’s. 
                                                 
1 At trial, no one from Corcon testified. DRPA’s chief 
engineer, Michael Venuto, acknowledged the film project 
during a line of questioning by Alpha’s counsel ostensibly 
aimed at suggesting possible motives for DRPA to favor 
Corcon over Alpha. While Venuto admitted that this film 
required access to the bridge, Venuto did not think DRPA had 
any financial stake in the project. 
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Two determinations form the heart of Alpha’s challenge. 
First, DRPA declared that Alpha was “not [a] responsible” 
contractor under its guidelines because Alpha failed to remit 
certain accident experience forms (called OSHA 300 forms) 
and insurance data (in the form of Experience Modification 
Factors, or EMFs) in its bid package. A.1037. As discussed 
infra, DRPA uses this data to assess a bidder’s job-site 
“safety culture.” A.1756. Second, DRPA declared that 
Corcon was in fact the lowest bidder because of a 
“miscalculation” that DRPA perceived in Corcon’s bid. 
A.3821. DRPA’s conduct leading to these determinations (all 
of which occurred sometime between June 16 and August 9, 
2016) was the subject of Alpha’s challenge before the District 
Court. 
 
We too will focus on this time period. At trial, DRPA 
presented documentary evidence including its guidelines, 
emails to and from certain employees, and emails between 
DRPA and certain bidders, as well as the testimony of four of 
its employees. We think it most helpful to proceed by first 
briefly reviewing applicable portions of DRPA’s bidding 
guidelines. Next, we will discuss how DRPA analyzes OSHA 
300 forms and EMFs. Finally, we will recount the specific 
aspects of DRPA’s two determinations that are challenged by 
Alpha.  
 
1. DRPA’s Bidding Guidelines 
DRPA’s bidding guidelines are internal regulations 
adopted by DRPA that govern its procurement of services for 
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work on its bridges.2  When DRPA seeks construction and 
maintenance services, in particular, it uses the Competitive 
Sealed Bid procurement method. Under that method, DRPA 
must issue an Invitation for Bids (“IFB”) detailing the project, 
collect and publically open sealed bids at a set time and place, 
and declare an apparent low bidder. Then, after a subsequent 
investigation, the guidelines require that DRPA award the 
contract to the “lowest responsible and responsive [b]idder” 
unless all bids are rejected or the lowest bidder is allowed to 
withdraw its bid. A.110 (emphasis added). 
 
The guidelines thus set up a process whereby DRPA 
must perform two distinct review inquiries. First, DRPA must 
determine, within ten days of submission, whether a bid is 
responsive. See A.495 (“Responsiveness of a bid is 
determined within ten (10) business days from the bid itself . . 
. .”). A responsive bid is one that “conforms in all material 
respects to the requirements and criteria in the invitation for 
bids.” A.489. DRPA may, however, “waive technical defects 
or immaterial items” that would otherwise make a bid 
nonresponsive so long as the waiver does not undermine the 
competitive character of the bidding process. A.495.  
 
Second, DRPA must separately determine whether the 
lowest bidder is responsible. A “responsible bidder . . . 
possess[es] the capability to fully perform the contract 
requirements in all respects and the integrity and reliability to 
assure good faith performance.” A.524 (internal quotation 
                                                 
2 By “bidding guidelines,” we refer to the set of 
documents DRPA submitted to the District Court which 
govern its procurement process, particularly the Invitation for 
Bids, the Procurement Manual, and Engineers Manual. 
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marks omitted). Unlike responsiveness, this requirement 
“goes to the capacity of the bidder . . . rather than its 
willingness to perform on [DRPA’s] terms.” Id. “[C]apacity 
to perform involves not only its ability to meet quality, 
quantity and time requirements, but its business integrity to 
assure honest, good faith performance.” Id. DRPA “may not 
presume that all bidders . . . are responsible,” but instead has 
an “affirmative duty” to make this determination with respect 
to the lowest bidder and to document its reasons for doing so 
in the contract file. Id. 
 
If DRPA determines that the lowest bidder is 
responsible, DRPA must accept that bidder. DRPA may reject 
a bidder as “not responsible” and select a higher bidder, but 
only if its “investigation discloses a substantial reason” for 
doing so. Id. (emphasis added). The guidelines are clear that 
“[DRPA] should not base a determination of 
nonresponsibility on a single bad item or report unless the 
behavior or financial condition . . . is of a sufficiently serious 
nature as to call into question the ability or integrity of the 
bidder . . . to perform the contract.” A.526 (emphasis added).  
 
The guidelines go on, in a lengthy chapter dedicated 
entirely to the responsibility inquiry, to describe the rigorous, 
wide-ranging investigation that DRPA should undertake to 
fulfill this duty. The guidelines state that DRPA “is not 
limited in its investigation to reviewing information provided 
by the bidder[] with its bid[]” and “should take any steps it 
determines are necessary to ensure that a bidder . . . is 
responsible.” A.526. Such steps include “request[ing] a 
bidder . . . to supply financial, educational, and experience 
information as well as references” or “requesting further 
clarification from the bidder[] as appropriate” during its 
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review. A.526. DRPA may also perform news and internet 
searches or public record database searches, and may review 
corporate filings, published consumer ratings, and 
certifications, just to mention a few. 
 
 
 
2. DRPA’s Review of OSHA 300 Forms and EMF Factors 
According to DRPA, an important part of its 
responsibility investigation involves determining whether the 
bidder has a history of performing safely on the job. To 
facilitate this review, the IFB (§ A.10.3) states that all bidders 
“will supply with its [b]id, accident experience in the form of 
the standard OSHA 300 Report and its Experience 
Modification Factors [(“EMFs”)] for all work completed in 
the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, covering the preceding three (3) reporting 
years.” A.84. DRPA then uses these EMFs and OSHA 300 
forms to assess the “safety culture” of the bidder. A.1756.  
 
OSHA 300 forms are completed by the contractor 
annually and provide a summary of the total number of 
company employees, total hours worked by those employees, 
the number of injuries reported, and a brief description of 
each injury. 
 
EMFs are a creature of the insurance industry. They 
are numerical multipliers generated yearly by state-designated 
ratings bureaus, and they are assigned to every company that 
performs work within a particular state. The EMF calculation 
that produces this multiplier takes into account the frequency 
and severity of workers’ compensation claims filed against 
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the company in that state. It does not account for workplace 
injuries to non-employees or injuries that do not result in a 
workers’ compensation claim. Insurance firms then use a 
company’s EMF to adjust the amount of workers’ 
compensation insurance premium it has to pay for that year. 
For example, a company assigned a 1.00 EMF pays the 
standard market rate for insurance. A company assigned an 
EMF of less than 1.00 will get a “credit” on its premium and 
will pay less than the standard market rate for its insurance, 
while a company assigned an EMF greater than 1.00 will pay 
more. 
 
Some states assign new contractors (or contractors 
who have never performed work in that state) an EMF of 
1.00. But other states, like Pennsylvania, report that a new 
contractor “does not qualify” for an EMF (because it does not 
meet Pennsylvania’s payroll threshold to qualify). From an 
insurance premium perspective, however, a company that 
“does not qualify” is indistinguishable from a firm assigned a 
1.00 EMF because both would pay the standard market rate of 
insurance.3 
 
How DRPA actually goes about employing this 
information to assess “safety culture” was the subject of much 
discussion at trial. As best we can tell, once DRPA receives 
bids for a given project, the senior engineer separates the bid 
                                                 
3 DRPA’s Director of Risk Management and Safety, 
Marianne Staszewski did not disagree. She only noted that 
from a “safety” review perspective, “does not qualify” means 
that there “is no measurement of [a firm’s] safety 
performance” and its record in this regard would therefore be 
“inconclusive.” A1782. 
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into its constituent parts and sends the OSHA 300 forms and 
EMFs to DRPA’s Department of Risk Management and 
Safety. Marianne Staszewski, the Department’s director (and 
the Department’s only employee), then “[performs] a risk 
management review” of the OSHA 300s and EMFs, A.1709, 
which essentially amounts to determining whether the bidder 
has a positive “safety culture,” A.1756.  
DRPA’s review, however, seems more perfunctory 
than analytic. In order to determine the “safety culture” of the 
bidder, Staszewski averages the three EMFs supplied with the 
bid.4 A.1756. If the average is 1.25 or greater, she concludes, 
in her words, that the “contractor has had significant 
frequency or severity of losses within the last three years . . . 
which translates into not working safely on the job.” A.1747. 
If the EMF average is less than 1.25, she approves the bidder 
because she is satisfied that it is “not suffering frequency and 
severity of losses.” Id. During this process, Staszewski also 
considers the quantitative aspects of a bidder’s OSHA 300s—
the number of employees, hours worked, injuries reported—
to contextualize its EMF score, although it was not clear from 
her testimony how this impacts her final analysis.5 She does 
                                                 
4 Staszewski testified that she considers EMFs only 
from the three most recent completed calendar years because 
the current, unfinished year provides a “green” number that 
indicates only a partial picture of safety for that year. A.1713. 
So for the Phase 2 contract, DRPA considered 2015, 2014, 
and 2013 EMFs. 
5 Compare A.1757 (“[T]he EMF factor is a statistical 
result of this OSHA 300 form, so you cannot take that out of 
the equation.”), with A.1759 (“The consequence of my 
analysis is, if the prior three years averaged 1.25 or less, then 
they are approved.”). 
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not consider the portion of the OSHA 300 form that describes 
the reported injuries.6  
We now turn to the two disputed portions of DRPA’s 
review in this case. 
 
3. DRPA’s Evaluation of Alpha’s and Corcon’s OSHA 300 
and EMFs 
 
With respect to Alpha’s bid: on June 16, 2016, the day 
of the bid opening, DRPA’s staff undertook a quick 
responsiveness review to determine compliance with § 
A.10.3. Jacurak and Ash testified that they flipped through 
Alpha’s bid and noticed that it did not include OSHA 300 
forms. DRPA, however, did not declare Alpha’s bid “not 
responsive” to the IFB. Instead, Jacurak and Ash notified 
DRPA’s general counsel to get guidance. Very little emerged 
about these discussions at trial, but apparently, counsel 
instructed the staff to circulate both Alpha’s and Corcon’s 
bids, rather than just Alpha’s, to DRPA’s various departments 
for a responsibility determination. 
 
Three weeks later, on July 7, 2016, Jacurak emailed 
Staszewski with Alpha’s EMF letter attached.7 Alpha had 
                                                 
6 In fact, Staszewski admitted that some rather 
egregious safety violations would not affect her analysis in 
any way. Alpha’s counsel posed a hypothetical wherein a 
contractor drops an I-beam on a train passing on the bridge 
below, killing all aboard. Staszewski stated that so long as 
none of the persons on the train were employees, this fact 
would not be considered in DRPA’s safety analysis. 
7 The documents presented at trial indicated that 
Jacurak also sent Staszewski a Department of Labor website 
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submitted a letter from its insurance broker which stated that 
“[Alpha] did not qualify for experience [EMF] rating[s] in 
2016, 2015, 2014 and 2013” in either Pennsylvania or New 
Jersey. A.1021. It is undisputed that Alpha had not performed 
work in Pennsylvania or New Jersey as an individual entity in 
the last five years, although it had done work in Pennsylvania 
as part of a joint venture in 2013 and 2014 (which resulted in 
the joint venture being assigned an EMF of .933 and .837, 
respectively).8 Staszewski determined that she could not 
effectively review Alpha’s safety record under her EMF 
policy because “[Alpha] did no work in the State of 
Pennsylvania, . . . did no work in the State of New Jersey, 
[and thus] ha[d] no work experience” over these three years, 
A.1760, from which she could “conclusively” determine its 
safety culture, A.1786.  
 
After roughly three more weeks of silence, on July 28, 
2016, Ash prepared and sent Alpha a letter rejecting its bid 
(the “July 28 Rejection Letter”). The letter first cited the 
requirement that the bidder supply OSHA 300 forms and 
EMFs. Then it stated that Alpha’s “failure to provide the 
OSHA Form 300 and its inability to provide experience 
modification factors back through 2013 prevent[ed DRPA] 
                                                                                                             
printout containing information about Alpha’s experience. 
Jacurak claimed that this printout was submitted with Alpha’s 
bid in lieu of its OSHA 300 forms. The record is unclear 
what, if any, impact this had on DRPA’s analysis. 
8 These 2013 and 2014 EMFs were not reported in the 
broker letter. Alpha’s insurance broker later mailed DRPA a 
second letter containing these EMFs and reporting that it had 
incorrectly stated Alpha had not performed any work in 
Pennsylvania. 
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from substantially evaluating Alpha’s safety record.” A.1037. 
As a result, DRPA declared that it found “Alpha ‘not 
responsible’ for the subject Project, and therefore, [that] 
Alpha’s bid [was] rejected.” Id.  
 
At trial, the parties vigorously disputed whether Alpha 
actually submitted its OSHA 300 forms, an inquiry which 
consumed much of the District Court’s time. Tom Kousis, 
Alpha’s project manager in charge of its Phase 2 bid, testified 
at length that he remembered submitting the forms. He 
pointed to a box on the bid form that he checked 
contemporaneously to his binding the bid package together. 
Jacurak and Ash maintained that none were submitted. 
Because no copies of Alpha’s paper bid were made and all 
submissions were unbound during the subsequent bid review 
phase, it was impossible to determine from the documentary 
evidence whether Alpha had submitted these records. 
 
The remainder of the testimony at trial focused on 
DRPA’s determination that Alpha was “not responsible.” 
Alpha’s counsel tried to pinpoint exactly who made this 
guidelines determination. But no one seemed to know. 
Staszewski testified that she had no idea who made that 
determination in this case, and had only the faintest clue who 
does so in the ordinary course. Her “understanding” was that 
Amy Ash would make that call. A.1794. Ash, however, 
declined having anything to do with the responsibility 
determination. She testified that Jacurak told her “the director 
of risk management [i.e., Staszewski] found Alpha to be 
nonresponsible.” A.1618. Jacurak reported “that is either – I 
have to say it’s between legal and contracts administration.” 
A.1532. DRPA’s general counsel did not testify, nor is it clear 
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what business input, if any, he or she had in these 
determinations. 
 
Alpha’s counsel also questioned whether Staszewski, 
who the District Court described as “visibly flummoxed” at 
trial,9 had identified anything in Alpha’s submission or 
otherwise that suggested it was not a safe contractor. She 
maintained that Alpha’s record, without EMFs, was 
inconclusive and therefore could not be approved. When 
asked about Alpha’s out-of-state record painting bridges, she 
claimed that it was “not pertinent” to her analysis for DRPA’s 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania bridges, although she conceded 
that it might be relevant to assessing Alpha’s “safety.” 
A.1782. She insisted that it was “not feasible” to even ask 
Alpha about its out-of-state record, A.1783, intimating only 
that her superior told her once not to contact bidders during 
her review. She also admitted to knowing that Alpha had 
previously performed work in Pennsylvania in 2014 as part of 
a joint venture. 
 
Alpha’s counsel also asked Staszewski whether, as a 
consequence of her EMF analysis, DRPA would only 
“approve” contractors that had previously performed work in 
New Jersey or Pennsylvania in the last three years. She said 
no. In fact, Staszewski admitted that it was “possible” that a 
new contractor that had never been assigned an EMF in 
Pennsylvania or New Jersey and had done no work there 
could be approved under her EMF policy, although she could 
                                                 
9 Alpha Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Delaware 
River Port Auth., No. 116-CV-05141 (NLH)(AMD), 2016 
WL 5339576, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2016). 
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not list, when asked, what other factors she might consider in 
so finding. 
 
Staszewski disclosed that she did contact Alpha’s 
insurance broker to confirm that Alpha had not performed any 
work in Pennsylvania or New Jersey. She did not contact 
Alpha directly. No one at DRPA did. To the contrary, because 
he had not heard from DRPA since being declared the lowest 
bidder, Kousis repeatedly called and emailed DRPA staff to 
inquire whether DRPA had sufficient information to complete 
its review. Most calls and emails were ignored. Kousis 
reached Jacurak once by phone sometime in July, but Jacurak 
did not mention that Alpha failed to submit its OSHA 300s. 
  
Not much else exists in the record regarding DRPA’s 
review of Alpha. Other portions of the bid were sent to other 
DRPA departments, but the status of their review is not 
known. DRPA’s chief engineer, Michael Venuto testified that 
because Staszewski withheld her approval, he never contacted 
Alpha’s references from other jobs, performed due diligence 
with respect to noise control, assessed compliance with Coast 
Guard requirements, or investigated Alpha’s ability to 
provide under-deck staging. 
 
With respect to Corcon, its bid was missing the 
requisite 2013 EMF—its broker letter provided usable EMFs 
for 2014 and 2014 only. Upon noticing its absence, 
Staszewski called Corcon’s broker, who provided an updated 
insurance letter containing the missing 2013 EMF. 
Staszewski then concluded, after averaging Corcon’s EMFs, 
that it “embrace[d] a safety culture.” A.1756. She then 
approved its bid from a safety review perspective. It is not 
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clear from the record, what, if any, other responsibility 
investigation DRPA undertook with respect to Corcon.  
 
 
 
 
4. DRPA’s Modification of Corcon’s Bid on August 9, 
2016 
 
Alpha also challenged DRPA’s subsequent 
modification of Corcon’s bid, which had the effect of making 
Corcon the lowest bidder. The IFB required bidders to 
propose a price for “Mobilization and Clean-up” costs, which, 
according to the IFB, was not to exceed 7.5% of the total bid 
price. A.361 (“Section Q”). Corcon’s bid exceeded this 7.5% 
limitation. Jacurak testified that he noticed this on June 17, 
2016, when he performed an initial review of the price 
schedules. However, he did not declare Corcon nonresponsive 
to the IFB. 
 
Instead, on August 9, 2016, nearly two months after 
discovering the discrepancy (and about two weeks after 
Alpha filed its bid protest), DRPA sent letters to all bidders 
stating that DRPA had “discovered” that three bidders (one of 
whom was Corcon) “may have incorrectly computed the 
Mobilization and Clean-up line item.” A.3820. It then cited 
IFB § A.7.5, which states in full:  
 
The Bidder shall state in the Form of Proposal 
the price per unit of measure or lump sum price, 
in words and in figures, for each scheduled item 
of Work, and the Total Price for the 
performance of the Work, as determined by 
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multiplying each estimated quantity by the price 
per unit of measure bid therefore and adding 
together the resulting amounts and any lump 
sum prices required. For the purposes of 
comparison of Bids received, the Total Price, 
correctly computed, stated in the Proposal will 
be considered to be the amount Bid for the 
Work and the award will be made on that Total 
Price. 
 
A.81 (italic and bold emphasis added). Relying on the 
italicized portion, and in particular the bolded phrase, 
“correctly computed,” DRPA asked each firm that bid more 
than 7.5% of its total bid price to “confirm” that the 
Mobilization costs quote “was, in fact, a miscalculation.” 
A.3821. DRPA then declared Corcon the lowest responsible 
bidder. Finally, after approving Corcon’s bid, DRPA’s staff 
recommended Corcon to the Board of Commissioner’s 
Operations and Maintenance Committee.  
 
B. Proceedings before DRPA’s Board of Commissioners 
Alpha protested the July 28 Rejection Letter on July 
29, 2016 in a letter to DRPA, noting in particular that if 
DRPA’s decision was based on responsiveness, it should have 
been made earlier and that DRPA “could have easily asked 
for the documents.” A.421. DRPA’s General Counsel denied 
a hearing and rejected the protest, although he permitted 
DRPA to file a written appeal to DRPA’s Board of 
Commissioners.  
 
The Operations and Maintenance Committee took up 
Alpha’s appeal and the recommendation to accept Corcon’s 
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bid at a special meeting dedicated solely to these matters on 
August 10, 2016. Alpha did not attend this meeting. The 
meeting began at 10:40 am and the Committee immediately 
moved into executive session. No transcript or minutes were 
taken. The Committee then went back on the record at 10:51 
am, approved DRPA’s recommendation to award the Phase 2 
contract to Corcon without discussion, and adjourned at 10:54 
am, three minutes later. 
 
DRPA’s full Board considered the Committee’s 
resolution to accept Corcon’s bid on August 17, 2016, at its 
regularly scheduled meeting. At the meeting, Alpha’s counsel 
gave a lengthy and detailed statement outlining its protest. 
The Board then moved into executive session for 20 minutes, 
although, again, no minutes were taken. When it emerged, it 
resolved to accept Corcon’s bid without acknowledging 
Alpha or hearing any public discussion of the Committee’s 
resolution. It then directed DRPA’s staff to enter negotiations 
with Corcon. 
 
C. Alpha’s Federal Lawsuit 
 On August 23, 2016, Alpha filed suit in the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey on an expedited basis 
claiming that DRPA’s award violated its guidelines and thus 
was arbitrary and capricious under New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and federal common law.10 The complaint requested 
                                                 
10 Alpha also claimed that DRPA’s conduct violated its 
due process rights, the New Jersey Open Public Meetings 
Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:4-6, and the Pennsylvania Sunshine 
Act, 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. 701. 
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injunctive relief including an order directing DRPA to award 
the contract to Alpha. 
 
The District Court held a four-day bench trial. In a 
lengthy opinion, the District Court separately considered and 
rejected both of DRPA’s stated reasons—lack of OSHA 300 
forms and lack of EMFs—although it focused on DRPA’s 
EMF policy.11 Alpha Painting & Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Delaware River Port Auth., No. 116-CV-05141 
(NLH)(AMD), 2016 WL 5339576, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 
2016). It found DRPA’s reliance on EMFs troubling. Because 
EMFs only accounted for workers’ compensation injuries, it 
deemed them an underinclusive proxy for a bidder’s safety 
record. It also found, based on the testimony of Alpha’s 
insurance broker, that Alpha’s failure to qualify for EMFs 
was not indicative of a poor safety record. Alpha’s record was 
no different, in the District Court’s view, from the 
hypothetical new contractor, who Staszewski said could be 
approved under her test. Thus, it ultimately concluded that 
“[n]othing in the record before [DRPA] prior to its final 
decision to characterize Alpha as non-responsible justified 
                                                 
11 As noted, the parties disputed whether Alpha 
submitted the OSHA 300 forms. The District Court, however, 
declined to find one way or the other, characterizing the 
evidence as being in “equipoise” on that issue. Alpha 
Painting, 2016 WL 5339576, at *3. Nevertheless, the District 
Court found that the “OSHA 300 forms played no meaningful 
role . . . in DRPA’s risk management and safety review.” Id. 
at 5. Because we ultimately conclude that Staszewski failed to 
point to any evidence going to Alpha’s inability to do the 
bridge work safely, OSHA forms included, we do not focus 
on this reason separately in our analysis. 
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that conclusion and nothing before [the District] Court 
support[ed] it either.” Id. at *8. 
 
The District Court also rejected DRPA’s claim that the 
agency had authority to modify Corcon’s Mobilization and 
Clean-up cost quote. It concluded that DRPA did not have 
authority to make that change under IFB § A.7.5 and that 
DRPA’s delay in exercising this alleged authority, despite 
being aware of the defect on June 17, 2016, suggested that the 
modification was a pretext to ensure that Corcon was awarded 
the contract.12 
 
With respect to the remedy, the District Court found 
that irreparable harm would result if DRPA were not enjoined 
from proceeding on the contract with Corcon and reasoned 
that “there is no need to start the bidding process over, as 
such a remedy would be adverse to the public good, and 
                                                 
12 The District Court also found that DRPA’s review 
process was “[o]paque and [u]nreviewable.” Alpha Painting, 
2016 WL 5339576, at *11. It was troubled by DRPA’s 
counsel’s “intimate[] involve[ment in] the bid review 
process,” which resulted in DRPA claiming attorney client 
privilege “at every turn when . . . DRPA’s employees were 
questioned about any decision-making.” Id. at *12. This, in 
the District Court’s view, effectively prevented review of 
DRPA’s decision.  
The District Court declined to rule on Alpha’s due 
process, Open Public Meetings Act, or Sunshine Act claims. 
Id. at *15 n.34. Instead, it noted DRPA’s lack of transparency 
“buttressed” its finding that DRPA acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Id. at *15 n.33. 
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unfair to Alpha.” Id. at *15. To the contrary, it found Alpha 
was “fully capable and qualified to perform the work required 
under the contract, and [was] ready to mobilize immediately.” 
Id. As support, it cited that Alpha’s OSHA 300 forms showed 
Alpha had only one workers’ compensation injury reported 
nationally over the last three years, while Corcon had seven 
on the Phase 1 project alone; that Alpha had been issued QP1 
and QP2 certifications from the Society for Protective 
Coatings “which confirm[ed] that Alpha is capable of 
removing industrial hazardous paint,” id. at *8 n.21; and that 
Alpha has significant experience painting bridges. The 
District Court then entered an order “permanently enjoin[ing 
DRPA] from awarding Contract No. CB-31-2016 (Phase II) 
to any entity other than [Alpha], and [DRPA] shall award 
Contract CB-31-2016 (Phase II) to [Alpha].” A.13.  
 
This expedited appeal followed.   
II. Analysis13 
After a bench trial, as here, we review the District 
Court’s factual findings, and mixed questions of law and fact, 
for clear error, and we review the Court’s legal conclusions 
de novo.  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 
273, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2014) (“On appeal from a bench trial, 
our court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear 
error and its conclusions of law de novo.  For mixed questions 
of law and fact we apply the clearly erroneous standard 
except that the District Court’s choice and interpretation of 
                                                 
13 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  
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legal precepts remain subject to plenary review.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)); see also Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Attn’y Gen., 825 F.3d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 2016); 
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 196 (3d Cir. 
2013); Country Floors, Inc. v. P’ship Composed of Gepner & 
Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 1991). We review an 
order granting injunctive relief under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. 
Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
DRPA raises numerous challenges to the District 
Court’s order, but we consider only three material to 
resolving its appeal.14 DRPA claims (A) that the District 
Court abused its discretion by declaring that DRPA arbitrarily 
and capriciously rejected Alpha and selected Corcon; (B) that 
it was reversible error to fail to join Corcon, who DRPA 
claims was a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; and 
(C) that the District Court erred when it directed DRPA to 
                                                 
14 Because the District Court declined to rule on 
Alpha’s due process claim and other state law claims under 
the Open Meetings Act and Sunshine Act, we find it 
unnecessary to consider DRPA’s arguments regarding these 
issues. DRPA also argues that the District Court’s lengthy 
discussion about DRPA’s repeated invocation of attorney-
client privilege during trial amounted to an adverse inference 
that influenced its ultimate arbitrary and capricious ruling. 
See supra, note 12. We do not read the opinion this way. The 
District Court noted only that DRPA’s use of privilege 
prevented the District Court from effectively reviewing 
DRPA’s conduct. Regardless of whether DRPA claimed 
privilege, DRPA still had the burden to provide a rational 
basis for its action. As we conclude below, it failed to do so. 
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award the Phase 2 contract to Alpha. We consider each 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
A. DRPA’s Rejection of Alpha and Selection of Corcon 
With respect to the first issue, DRPA maintains that it 
was not arbitrary and capricious (1) to label Alpha “not 
responsible” or (2) to modify Corcon’s Mobilization line 
item. Both determinations had the effect of making Corcon 
the lowest, responsible bidder. 
 
A District Court’s review of an agency’s procurement 
decision “is extremely limited in scope.” Princeton 
Combustion Research Labs., Inc. v. McCarthy, 674 F.2d 
1016, 1021 (3d Cir. 1982). Because such decisions implicate 
an agency’s expertise, we must be careful not to “substitute 
[our] judgment for the agency’s.” Id. At the same time, we 
may not shirk our judicial duty to ensure that a government 
agency has complied with applicable bidding rules and 
regulations, which exist in part for the public’s benefit by 
ensuring that the agency obtains the most advantagous 
contract available. Thus, a district court may not overturn a 
procurement decision “unless the aggrieved bidder 
demonstrates that there was no rational basis for the agency’s 
decision.” Sea–Land Servs., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 434 
(3d Cir. 1979); see also R.A. Glancy & Sons, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 180 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Coco Bros. Inc. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(recoginzing that discretion to award injunctive relief in 
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procurement cases “is restricted to circumstances where the 
governmental agency’s action is illegal or irrational”).  
 
However, if the agency provides a rational basis for its 
action, our inquiry comes to an end. See Princeton 
Combustion, 674 F.2d at 1022 (holding that, as a matter of 
law, where the procurement decision was rational, a 
reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the 
presence of procurdural irregularities in the procurement 
process).15  
                                                 
15 The parties rely on our previous bidding dispute 
cases without addressing a crucial distinction present here: 
nearly all of those cases involve challenges to contract awards 
by federal agencies brought under the Administrative 
Procedures Act. DRPA, however, is a bi-state corporate 
instrumentality created under the Compact Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Allied Painting, Inc. v. Del. River Port 
Auth., No. CIV.A. 04-1032 (MAM), 2005 WL 724107, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2005) (recognizing that it is an open 
question whether DRPA is a federal agency governed by the 
APA or a state agency governed by state administrative law). 
For purposes of review in this diversity case, we do not think 
this distinction is material. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706 
(permitting federal courts to set aside agency action under the 
APA that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion”), with Textar Painting Corp. v. Del. River Port 
Auth., 600 A.2d 795, 799-800 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 
1996) (noting, in bid dispute case, that “the actions of . . . 
DRPA are reviewable by [the] court,” and applying “arbitrary 
and unreasonable” standard). 
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Accordingly, we turn now to DRPA’s arguments that it 
had a rational basis under its guidelines for its actions. 
 
 
 
 
1. Alpha’s Failure to Submit OSHA 300 Forms and EMFs 
DRPA argues that it has a rational basis for labeling 
Alpha not responsible. We cannot see how. DRPA essentially 
faults the responsiveness of Alpha’s bid package and relies 
exclusively on Alpha’s failure to provide OSHA forms and 
EMFs. But DRPA did not label Alpha non-responsive. 
Instead, it rejected Alpha as “not responsible.” We have 
closely scrutinized the record and have been unable to find 
any justification casting doubt on Alpha’s “capability” or 
“capacity” to perform abrasive lead paint stripping and 
repainting.16 Moreover, we do not think DRPA’s guidelines 
                                                 
16 Most of DRPA’s arguments on appeal, in an 
apparent effort to distract us from this glaring deficiency in 
proof, are directed at the District Court’s finding that DRPA’s 
EMF policy was an underinclusive safety metric. DRPA 
argues that the District Court impermissibly substituted its 
personal judgment and opinion on this safety issue in 
violation of our standard. We think, however, that DRPA’s 
arguments miss the mark. The real issue is whether DRPA 
had any evidence—as a result of its EMF policy or 
otherwise—to support its determination that Alpha was “not 
responsible,” i.e., not capable. For the reasons herein, we 
think it did not. 
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allowed it to reject a bidder as not responsible based on this 
type of justification.17 
We begin with Marianne Staszewski, as her testimony 
was a focus of the parties’ briefing and DRPA’s contentions 
at oral argument. She did not identify any facts that could 
support DRPA’s responsibility finding. Staszewski simply did 
not approve Alpha because it had not supplied the bid safety 
information she was accustomed to receiving. That 
conclusion ultimately—and for reasons unknown—
manifested as DRPA’s affirmative finding that Alpha was 
“not responsible” in the July 28 Rejection Letter. DRPA 
maintains this was rational. However, we fail to see how 
Alpha’s failure to “qualify” for EMFs permitted DRPA to 
conclude that Alpha was “not responsible.” At least in terms 
of insurance risk, Alpha’s EMF history made it no different 
from a new contractor who had never performed work in 
Pennsylvania or New Jersey—both would pay the same 
standard market rate of insurance.18 Yet Staszewski said that 
she could not approve Alpha’s record, but could “possibl[y]” 
approve a hypothetical new contractor without EMFs. 
                                                 
17 Assuming, without deciding, that DRPA enjoys the 
same Skidmore deference afforded to administrative agencies 
when they interpret their own regulations, such deference 
would be minimal in this case given the lack of any binding 
effect outside DRPA, the lack of thoroughness in DRPA’s 
consideration, and the lack of persuasive reasoning. See 
Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 
2012) (setting forth the factors that determine how much 
deference we owe to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations). 
18 DRPA has not challenged this finding as clearly 
erroneous. 
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A.1784. She offered no reasoned explanation why. Surely, the 
absence of EMFs in a bidder’s record does not show 
“frequen[t] and sever[e] losses” on the job, which was 
Staszewski’s central safety criterion. A.1747. An absence of 
EMFs shows nothing one way or the other, and therefore was 
not evidence of Alpha’s inability to do the work safely. 
 
What we find so puzzling is that DRPA was aware of 
at least some evidence from which it could evaluate Alpha’s 
past safety performance. For example, Staszewski knew about 
Alpha’s 2014 joint venture work on another project in 
Pennsylvania. The joint venture was assigned an EMF of 
.837, which fell well below Staszewski’s 1.25 bright-line rule. 
She simply did not consider it. Moreover, DRPA maintains 
on appeal that it is “infeasible” to inquire into Alpha’s out-of-
state bridge painting experience, despite some evidence that 
most states subscribe to a national and uniform rating service. 
DRPA has not persuasively explained why this data was not 
at least relevant to assessing Alpha’s safety culture.19 
 
At most, Alpha’s bid was “not responsive” under the 
guidelines. Its alleged failure to submit OSHA 300 forms and 
EMFs (or a suitable equivalent) failed to “conform” to § 
A.10.3’s clear text. DRPA all but concedes this point, and 
essentially argues that it may also label a bidder “not 
                                                 
19 DRPA’s counsel urged at oral argument that it could 
accept only in state-bidders if it chose to do so. We are not 
persuaded. The bidding guidelines do not permit DRPA to 
narrow its field of potential contractors in this way, nor did 
DRPA discuss this at the pre-bid meeting, which many out-
of-state bidders attended.   
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responsible” at any time in the procurement process for the 
same reason.  
 
This line of argument, however, conflicts with 
DRPA’s own guidelines. The guidelines establish that 
responsiveness and responsibility are mutually exclusive 
inquiries. DRPA had ten days from bid submission to declare 
Alpha non-responsive to the IFB. It did not elect to do so here 
(nor do we think it could have done so on July 28, thirty-two 
days after this ten-day window closed). DRPA instead labeled 
Alpha “not responsible.” This designation triggered a 
different set of obligations and standards under the guidelines. 
DRPA had an affirmative duty to determine the lowest 
bidder’s responsibility, and could only reject its bid and select 
a higher bid if its investigation unearthed a “substantial 
reason” why the bidder was not “capable” or did not have the 
“capacity” to do the work. A.524. Indeed, the guidelines 
specifically contemplate that DRPA might have to look 
outside the four corners of the lowest bidder’s submission to 
fulfil that duty, including “requesting further clarification 
from the bidder[] as appropriate.” A.526. 
 
Here, for reasons that still elude us, DRPA appears to 
have simply given up once it determined that Alpha’s EMF 
record was inconclusive. DRPA did not contact Alpha to 
“request[] further clarification.” A.526. Jacurak, DRPA’s 
senior project engineer who knew about Alpha’s paperwork 
deficiencies, did not ask Kousis, Alpha’s project manager, 
about them during their call.20 DRPA also failed to perform 
                                                 
20 Jacurak and Staszewski cited DRPA’s practice of 
not contacting bidders during their review, which DRPA’s 
counsel emphasized to us at oral argument. We understand 
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many other responsibility inquiries, as DRPA’s chief engineer 
Venuto noted, such as contacting Alpha’s references. No 
public searches were done; no news searches; no certification 
assessments. Certainly nothing in the guidelines prohibited 
these sorts of inquiries. Rather, they are encouraged, if not 
mandated. In short, DRPA appears to have actually gone out 
of its way to avoid relevant safety history information with 
respect to Alpha. 
 
There is yet another problem with DRPA’s argument. 
Even if we were to agree with DRPA that it could designate a 
bidder as “not responsible” because the bidder’s safety record 
was unknowable from the four corners of its submission, 
DRPA does not seem to have applied that rule consistently in 
this case. Corcon failed to submit three years of EMFs 
(providing only two usable years—2015 and 2014). DRPA 
should have rejected Corcon for the same reason. We 
therefore agree with the District Court that DRPA’s 
application of its rules in this case gave unequal treatment to 
Alpha and Corcon. Cf. Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 747 F.3d 172, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 
216 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (“Agency action is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating 
similar situations differently.”). 
 
                                                                                                             
DRPA’s desire to maintain the appearance of impartiality, 
but, as Jacurak noted in his testimony, there is no provision in 
the guidelines prohibiting contact with a bidder. To the 
contrary, the provisions we note supra counsel DRPA to do 
exactly the opposite. 
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In sum, neither Staszewski nor any other employee or 
document proffered a rational basis—pursuant to DRPA’s 
1.25-or-lower EMF policy or otherwise—for labeling Alpha 
“not responsible.” DRPA’s testimony in fact revealed that no 
one knew who ultimately translated Staszewski’s conclusion 
that Alpha’s record contained insufficient materials to assess 
responsibility into the July 28 Rejection Letter, which 
affirmatively determined that Alpha was not responsible. We 
find that the District Court was correct in concluding that 
DRPA acted irrationally.  
2. DRPA’s Modification of Corcon’s Mobilization and 
Clean-up Cost Price 
 
DRPA next challenges the District Court’s finding that 
DRPA acted without authority when it subsequently limited 
Corcon’s Mobilization and Clean Up line item. Jacurak 
recognized on June 17, 2016 that, contrary to what the IFB 
required, Corcon had bid more than 7.5% of its total bid price 
for this line item. Although DRPA characterized this as a 
computation error within the meaning of IFB § A.7.5, DRPA 
did not move to “correct” the alleged miscalculation until two 
months after learning about it, and only until after Alpha had 
filed a bid protest. The District Court concluded that DRPA’s 
“discovery” was merely a pretext to ensure that Corcon was 
awarded the contract. On appeal, DRPA does not try to 
explain away the suggestive timing of this revision. Instead, it 
contends that Section Q and § A.7.5 of the IFB “expressly 
permit[]” it to reduce Corcon’s bid so that it complies with 
the IFB. DRPA Br. 41. 
 
This argument, however, borders on the frivolous. 
Section Q, which defines how DRPA will pay its contractor 
for each unit of work performed, says nothing about DRPA’s 
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power to modify a bidder’s final quote during its subsequent 
investigation. Section A.7.5, which is titled “Preparing 
Proposals,” is similarly unavailing because it merely instructs 
contractors how to add or multiply their bid prices. In this 
context, the phrase “correctly computed” can only plausibly 
refer to a limited authority to correct mathematical errors in 
the contractor’s computations of his Total Bid Price. A.81. 
The following section, § A.7.6, actually explains this. See 
A.82 (“If, during the tabulation of Bids, the Total Price on 
any Proposal is found to be incorrectly computed, [DRPA] 
reserves the right to make such changes as are necessary in 
the extended Amounts and Total Price, on the basis of the 
unit and lump sum prices given in words and the approximate 
quantities stated for the scheduled items therein.” (emphasis 
added)). Moreover, much like DRPA’s responsibility 
determination, the decision to modify Corcon’s bid appeared 
out of thin air. There is nothing in the IFB or otherwise that 
gives DRPA such expansive authority. The District Court 
correctly concluded that DRPA lacked the authority to 
modify Corcon’s bid. On August 9, 2016, Alpha was still the 
lowest bidder. 
* * * 
In sum, we agree with the District Court that DRPA’s 
conduct over this two-month period, taken together, suggests 
that it has gone out of its way to award the Phase 2 contract to 
Corcon and not Alpha. We are equally alarmed that DRPA’s 
Board of Commissioners gave virtually no attention to 
Alpha’s protest. And, after months of litigation, much still 
remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that DRPA’s 
actions defy reasonable explanation. Accordingly, we hold 
that DRPA’s rejection of Alpha and its eventual award to 
Corcon was “illegal [and] irrational,” Coco Bros., 741 F.2d at 
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679, and that the District Court’s order setting it aside was not 
an abuse of discretion. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Corcon as a necessary party under Rule 1921 
 Next, DRPA urges that we vacate the District Court’s 
order because Corcon, who was not joined in this action, was 
a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
19(a)(1)(B)(i). This rule provides that a party must be joined 
if the party has “an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the 
person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). We fail to see, however, how Corcon 
had a protectable interest relating to this dispute that would 
have necessitated its joinder.  
 
DRPA relies on Independent Enterprises Inc. v. 
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority, wherein we rejected a 
disappointed bidder’s procedural due process claim. 103 F.3d 
1165, 1178 (3d Cir. 1997). Because the bidder’s bid had 
                                                 
21 We undertake plenary review of a District Court’s 
ruling under Rule 19 that an absent party’s rights were not 
necessary. Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 500 
F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 2007). We may reach this issue on 
appeal, even if it was not raised in the district court. Disabled 
in Action v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 97 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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never been accepted by the state authority, we held that it 
“had no legally enforceable interest in receiving the 
contracts.” Id. at 1179. In so finding, we said that “one who 
bids on a public contract has no legitimate expectation of 
receiving it until the contract is actually awarded.” Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing Highway Express Lines v. Winter, 
200 A.2d 300, 303 (Pa. 1964)). DRPA seizes on this 
distinction between bidder and awardee to argue that because 
Corcon was “awarded” the contract, it obtained an 
enforceable property right. 
 
We disagree. We had no occasion in Independent 
Enterprises to explore, much less decide for Rule 19 
purposes, what it meant to “actually award[]” a contract. Id. 
Whatever that threshold may require, we think it clear that 
DRPA’s guidelines do not vest any property right in a DRPA 
awardee. DRPA’s Board’s resolution merely “authorize[ed] 
[DRPA’s] staff to negotiate a construction contract with . . . 
Corcon.” Supp. App. A.5. It did not create any contract rights. 
Moreover, the guidelines accord significant discretion to 
DRPA to negotiate with and even reject the eventual awardee 
specified in that resolution. For example, DRPA may seek to 
negotiate discounts with the awardee, see A.495, or may even 
reject the awardee as not responsible “later in the process and 
until the contract is fully executed,” A.524 (emphasis added). 
DRPA has not “fully executed” a contract with Corcon and 
thus it had no protectable property right. Cf. Coco Bros., 741 
F.2d at 677 (recognizing that “negotiations after initial 
acceptance of a bid postponed the date of the ‘final award’”).  
 
Even if it did have a property right, Alpha persuasively 
points out that Corcon’s interests were fully represented by 
DRPA, which zealously sought to uphold its designation of 
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Corcon as the lowest responsible bidder. See Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 
1979) (“The fact that the absent person may be affected by 
the judgment does not of itself require his joinder if his 
interests are fully represented by parties present.”). 
 
We note, too, that DRPA’s own representations in this 
case tend to undermine its claim that Corcon has a right to the 
Phase 2 contract. During trial, DRPA represented to the 
District Court that it would not award the contract until the 
litigation had been resolved. Moreover, during the pendency 
of this appeal, DRPA sent at least two letters to bidders 
requesting that they agree to “an extension of the date of 
award.” Supp. App. A1, A3. We decline to vacate the order 
on this ground. 
 
C. Remedy 
 Finally, we must decide whether the District Court 
erred when it directed DRPA to award the Phase 2 contract to 
Alpha. Because we conclude that the District Court exceeded 
its authority by deeming Alpha “responsible” under DRPA’s 
guidelines, we will vacate the portion of the order directing 
the contract award and remand for the entry of a more limited 
injunction. 
 
We have said that even when a disappointed bidder has 
shown an agency procurement decision to be irrational or 
illegal, “prudent judicial discretion may still refuse 
declaratory or injunctive relief because of overriding public 
interests.” Sea-Land Servs., 600 F.2d at 434. This is because 
“[j]udicial intrusion into government purchases necessarily 
delays completion of the contract and increases costs, with 
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little measurable benefit to the public.” Allis-Chalmers Corp., 
Hydro-Turbine Div. v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248, 252-53 (3d 
Cir. 1980). Thus to determine whether injunctive relief should 
be granted, district courts should weigh (1) the practical 
considerations of efficient procurement of supplies for 
continuing government operations, (2) the public interest in 
avoiding excessive costs, and (3) the bidder’s entitlement to 
fair treatment through adherence to statutes and regulations. 
Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 434. 
 
This case implicates a subsequent question in the 
remedy analysis: what is the appropriate scope of injunctive 
relief. The District Court directed DRPA to award the 
contract to Alpha. Although Sea-Land does not preclude this 
coercive form of relief, we have been clear that a district 
court “must not succumb to the temptation of substituting its 
judgment” for that of the agency’s procurement expertise. Id. 
at 435; see also Princeton Combustion, 674 F.2d at 1021 
(“The district court is not to substitute its judgment for the 
agency’s . . . .”). This is especially true where, as here, the 
agency is charged with determining whether a contractor is 
safe, responsible, and capable of performing a highly 
specialized and potentially hazardous construction project. 
Depending on the posture of the procurement, directing an 
agency to award a contract to a specific bidder has the high 
potential of transgressing this limitation. Accordingly, district 
courts should not direct an agency to award a contract to a 
specific bidder “unless it is clear that, but for the illegal 
behavior of the agency, the contract would have been 
awarded to the party asking the court to order the award.” 
Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); Cf. Choctaw Mfg. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 
609, 620 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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Here, the District Court weighed the Sea-Land factors 
and concluded, relevant to the first factor, that there was no 
need to “start the bidding process over, [which] would be 
adverse to the public good” and, relevant to the third, that 
irreparable harm to Alpha would result if DRPA was not 
enjoined from proceeding. Alpha Painting, 2016 WL 
5339576, at *15. We agree, and note in addition only that the 
second factor in this case is largely neutral given the 
relatively small gap between both Alpha’s and Corcon’s bid 
price. The Sea-Land factors, therefore, favor injunctive relief. 
 
However, we also agree with DRPA that the District 
Court abused its discretion by directing the agency to award 
the contract to Alpha because it is not clear that Alpha would 
have received the contract “but for” DRPA’s illegal conduct. 
We can sympathize with the District Court’s sentiment that 
Alpha appeared perfectly qualified to perform abrasive blast 
cleaning and painting. It possessed QP1 and QP2 
certifications from a recognized trade association and 
significant bridge painting experience. Alpha also seemed to 
be a safe contractor as its OSHA 300 forms show only one 
incident over three years.  
 
But DRPA never determined that Alpha was 
“responsible” with respect to safety, capability, or otherwise. 
In fact, there is clear testimony in the record that the July 28 
Rejection Letter effectively ended any further review of 
Alpha’s file. DRPA’s chief engineer noted that, as a result of 
that letter, DRPA never bothered to contact Alpha’s 
references from other jobs, never performed due diligence 
with respect to noise control, and never assessed compliance 
with respect to Coast Guard requirements or Alpha’s ability 
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to provide under-deck staging. We simply cannot be certain 
what those inquires might reveal or how DRPA’s engineering 
team might weigh them. We therefore do not know whether, 
but for the July 28 Rejection Letter, Alpha would have 
received the contract. Because DRPA never completed its 
responsibility investigation, the District Court’s factual 
finding that Alpha was “responsible” was an impermissible 
“substitut[ion] [of] judgment.” Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 435. 
The directed contract award, therefore, was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
Alpha responds by citing Ulstein Maritime Ltd. v. 
United States, 833 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir. 1987), as support for 
the District Court’s directed award. There, the court 
concluded that “but for” the violations of the applicable 
guidelines, “one of the other bidders” would have received 
the award. Id. at 1058 (citing Delta Data Sys., 744 F.2d at 
204). But, unlike here, the court did not award the contract to 
“any specific plaintiff.” Id. Instead, it ordered the Navy to 
“review the bids previously received and to award the 
contract to the next low, responsive and responsible bidder” 
because it was “possible,” upon remand, that “[the plaintiffs] 
may be rejected for defects in . . . responsibility, leading to 
the award of the contract to a higher bidder or to no bidder at 
all.” Id. Thus the order in Ulstein, far from lending support 
for the directed award here, “merely un[did] the illegal 
agency actions and instruct[ed] the agency to proceed with 
the procurement which [was] in progress.” Id.  
 
Therefore, we think Ulstein actually counsels in favor 
of a more limited injunction, the goal of which, in the 
circumstances of this case, should be to undo the illegal 
action and return Alpha to competition. See Delta Data Sys., 
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744 F.2d at 206–07 (“[T]he main objective of our effort at 
framing a [bidding violation] remedy is to assure that the 
government obtains the most advantageous contracts by 
complying with the procedures . . . . Putting the disappointed 
bidder in the economic position it would have occupied but 
for the error is normally the best approach to this result.”); 
BCPeabody Constr. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 
502, 514 (2013) (ordering agency to restore apparent-low-
bidder to competition for contract and requiring agency to 
“reevaluate [the] proposals”); Beta Analytics Int’l, Inc. v. 
United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 155, 159 (2007) (“A reevaluation 
restores to a victim of arbitrary and capricious procurement 
activity its substantial chance to receive the contract award.”).  
 
Here, DRPA arbitrarily removed Alpha from 
contention for the Phase 2 contract. Accordingly, Alpha 
should be restored to competition and DRPA should evaluate 
Alpha’s bid and affirmatively determine, per its guidelines, 
whether Alpha, the lowest bidder, is a “responsible” 
contractor. We therefore will vacate the portion of the District 
Court’s order directing DRPA to award CB-31-2016 to Alpha 
and remand to the District Court for it to fashion a more 
limited injunction consistent with this opinion.  
 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in 
part, and remand to the District Court. 
